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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE
ADMISSIBILITY OF INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE TO
FEDERAL OFFICER BY DEFENDANT WHILE ASLEEP
Broc: v. United States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955)
Following a raid upon an illegal still, federal revenue agents ap-
proached a nearby house where the "moonshiners" had been seen prior
to the raid. One of the agents, while standing outside an open window
of the house, saw the defendant asleep inside. Pretending to be one of
the moonshiners, the agent elicited incriminating statements from the
defendant while he remained asleep. These statements were admitted,
over objection, in a subsequent trial in which the defendant was con-
victed of violating Internal Revenue laws prohibiting the illegal manu-
factunre of liquor. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
admission of the statements made by defendant while asleep violated
his privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment,
since he was not afforded a "fair chance" to exercise his privilege
before being compelled to testify against himself.,
1. Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955). The court also held
that the agent's looking through the open window constituted an unreasonable-
search under the fourth amendment. On the basis of Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 633, c : (1886), the court could have held that any evidence obtained as a
result of a violation of the fourth amendment was also inadmissible as a violation
of the fifth amendment, Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925);
Goul,, v. United States 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921), or simply that it was inad-
missible htecause obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, Weeks v. United
States, 2::2 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). See also Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence
Obta ,,d TIhroogh Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 CoLuar. L. REv. 11
(1925); Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clau ,, in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1398 (1938). For a severe
criticism of the federal rule excluding illegally obtained evidence, see 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
There is some doubt, however, whether the fourth amendment was violated.
The court based its reasoning upon McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948). In that case police officers illegally broke into a rooming house. Pro-
ceedlin f down a hallway, one of them stood on a chair and, looking through a tran-
som, saw the defendant operating a lottery. Gaining entrance, the officers seized
evidentiary chattels. The search was held illegal and the evidence inadmissible.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson explained that the search was illegal
because the officers had illegally entered the house and consequently everything
follow;ng that entry was also illegal. But he also indicated that if they had
entered the house legally, they could have peeped through the keyhole or could
hare elrn bed ov one another's shoulders to look through the transom and the
defen ,fnt woId have had no grounds on which to complain. Id. at 458-59.
Furthermore, it was held in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), that
the unreasonable search and seizure provision in the fourth amendment does not
extend to open fields around a house even though officers might be trespassers
upon the property. It is submitted that the Hester and McDonald cases are
possible authority for the proposition that the fourth amendment does not extend
to the situation where a federal officer stands outside a house and looks through
a window. But see Hobson v. United States, 226 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1955).
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Traditionally, the privilege against self-incrimination protects a
person from testimonial compulsion, i.e., any disclosure sought by
legal process against him as a witness.2 It extends to all judicial or
official hearings, investigations, and inquiries where the person is
formally called upon to give testimony.3 Under this view, the obtain-
ing of evidence from the accused without the use of legal process is
not covered by the privilege.4
Historically, evidence obtained in violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination is excluded upon a theory distinct5 from that which
prohibits the admission of coerced confessions.6 The privilege is based
upon the theory that a person should not be compelled to be his own
accuser, while the confession-rule is based upon the theory that an
accused's statements may be testimonially untrustworthy when ob-
tained under certain circumstances.7 Under tests adopted by various
courts, a confession is testimonially untrustworthy if it is induced by
physical force or by threats or promises operating upon the fears or
hopes of the accused.8 The shorthand expression of these tests found
in most opinions is that a confession, to be admissible, must be "vol-
2. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (3d ed. 1940). See also Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U.S. 547 562 (1892); Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795, 802 (7th
Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 689 (1921); United States v. Goodner, 35 F.
Supp. 286, 290 (D. Colo. 1940).
3. McComIcK, EVIDENCE § 123 (1954).
4. 8 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2263-64 (3d ed. 1940); MCCoRDMCK, EVIDENCE
§ 126 (1954).
5. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 823, 2266 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 75 n.9 (1954).
6. It appears that coerced admissions are also inadmissible in federal criminal
trials. Sykes v. United States, 143 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (admission intro-
duced in evidence held not to be error where it was not claimed to have been
coerced) ; Gulotta v. United States, 113 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 1940) (stating
arguendo that coerced admissions are inadmissible in evidence).
The court in the principal case did not distinguish whether defendant's state-
ments were in the nature of a confession or an admission. "A confession is a
complete acknowledgment of guilt of the crime on trial. An admission is any
other statement of a fact, revelant to the charge, made by the accused and offered
against him as evidence of the fact." MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 113 (1954). For
the purposes of the present inquiry, defendant's statements will be treated as a
confession. It is apparent that if it is concluded that the statements are admis-
sible when treated as a confession, a fortiori, they would also be admissible if
they were treated as an admission.
Some state courts have permitted the use of coerced admissions. State v.
Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 186, 185 P.2d 757, 765 (1947) (evidence that admissions were
not voluntarily made was rejected); People v. Trawick, 78 Cal. App. 2d 604, 608,
178 P.2d 45, 48 (1947) (admissions are "admissible in evidence irrespective of
their voluntary character"). At the present time, there is some doubt as to
whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment excludes the use in
state courts of coerced admissions as it does in the case of coerced confessions.
As to the latter, see note 13 inf'a. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946),
the Supreme Court held that the introduction in evidence of a coerced admission
was a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. But
see Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 163 n.5 (1953) where, without mentioning
the Ashcraft case, the Court stated in dicta that the fourteenth amendment did
not require the exclusion of coerced admissions.
7. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
8. 3 id. §§ 824-25.
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untary." 1 The rules covering the admissibility of confessions should
not be confused with the privilege against self-incrimination merely
because the latter protects against compulsory disclosures and con-
fessions are admissible only if found to be voluntary. Traditionally,
the privilege is limited to officially compelled testimony while the
confession-rule extends to statements obtained without the use of
legal process.'
In Brami v. United States," however, the Supreme Court excluded
a coerced confession upon the theory that its admission in a federal
criminal trial was a violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. It is apparent that the Court confused the origins of the privi-
lege and the rules covering confessions since it stated that the privi-
lege was a crystallization of the doctrine covering confessions. 2 As a
result of the Bram case, therefore, a coerced confession may be ex-
cluded in the federal courts either on the ground that its admission
would be a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination or that
it would be testimonially untrustworthy under the confession-rule. 3
But did the Brawi case, although expanding the theory upon which
coerced confessions were excluded, change the tests determining their
!. Wigmiore states that, although judicial opinions often treat the voluntariness
of a confession as sufficient in itself to determine the admissibility of a confession,its validity rests upon the fundamental principle of the confession-rule, i.e.,
trustworthiness of the confession. Furthermore, the presence or absence of volun-
tariness is often determined by the other tests. 3 id. § 826. See text supported by
note 8 ,'pra. See also McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 111 (1954), where he states that
when used in connection with confessions the term "voluntary" does not mean that
the confession should be spontaneous, but rather it is limited "to the special con-
tent of freedom from physical force or threats thereof and absence of offers ofleniency and takes no account of other forms of pressure."
10. The confession-rule may also extend to statements made under compulsion
of legal process. For example, the rule could conceivably operate to exclude
statements made in court where the privilege is waived or is not claimed. For
other situations where the two principles might operate independently, see 8
WimMORu, EVnIDENCE § 2266 (3d ed. 1940).
11. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
12. Id. at 543. See 3 WIGMORE, EViDENcE § 821 n.2 (3d ed. 1940), wherehe criticizes the Brari case as being "the height of absurdity in misapplication
of the law." Although McCormick agrees that the Bran case is an "historicalblunder," he advances the proposition that in essence the privilege is meant toprotect one from being coerced into a confession, whether it be with or withoutlegal process, and that the rules covering confessions should be considered as
rules of privilege. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 75 (1954). See also Wan v. United
States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924).
12. The Supreme Court has held that the admission in state courts of coerced
confessions violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,285-86 (1936). No case has been found in which a coerced confession has been
excluded in a federal criminal trial squarely on the basis of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. The reason seems to be that, prior to the Brain case,
coerced confessions were excluded under the common law confession-rule and
therefore federal courts never had to decide this constitutional question. In view
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, however, there is no doubt that if the issue were squarely presented
the Court would exclude a coerced confession under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.
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admissibility? Earlier Supreme Court cases had accepted the his-
torical tests governing the admissibility of confessions. Thus, a con-
fession was not voluntary if induced by force, threats, or promises
which operated upon the fears or hopes of the accused. 14 The mere
fact that one was imprisoned, 15 or that officers were present,0 or that
the statements were made in answer to questions advanced by police
officers' 7 was not in itself sufficient to render a confession involuntary.
The Brain case expressly adopted all of these tests.'18 It is true that
the Court emphasized that in determining the admissibility of a con-
fession the inquiry should be directed to the question whether the
making of the confession was voluntary. But in determining that
question, the Court looked to external factors operating upon the mind
of the accused. 9 These factors were substantially the same as those
that historically governed the admissibility of confessions. Therefore,
it is clear that only the theory upon which the exclusion is based was
changed by the Brain case.20
It appears that the court in the principal case has made an unwise
extension of the privilege against self-incrimination. Conceding that
the privilege should be extended so as to exclude all coerced confes-
sions, 1 the statements made by the defendant in the principal case
were not "coerced" within the meaning of the tests adopted by the
Brain case.22 The emphasis here is not upon abuses committed by
officers-we have seen that mere questioning by the police is not suf-
ficient in itself to render a confession inadmissible-but rather it is
focused solely upon the accused and whether he had a "fair chance"
to exercise the privilege. Thus, the test in this case has become, did
the accused realize he was making incriminating statements? Such a
rule carried to its logical conclusion would place an unreasonable
handicap upon law enforcement, for it could eliminate proof of in-
criminating statements made by the accused before arrest,23 while
14. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1896); Sparf v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895) ; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884).
15. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895).
16. Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896).
17. Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907); Gray v. United States,
9 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1925) ; Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895)
(dictum).
18. 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 558 (1897).
19. Id. at 549. See also Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924) where
the Court states that any form of compulsion renders the confession involuntary
regardless of the character of the compulsion.
20. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43
ILm. L. Ruv. 442 n.2 (1948).
21. See note 12 supra.
22. See text supported by note 14 supra.
23. For example, see United States v. Burgman, 87 F. Supp. 568, 571 (D.D.C.
1949) where the defendant, a staff member of the American Embassy in Berlin,
was tried for treason on the ground that he had prepared German propaganda for'
broadcast to the United States during the Second World War. The court held
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intoxicated, 4 or while under a misapprehension of the hearer's iden-
tity or of the surrounding circumstances.25 In situations where the
accused, without compulsion, makes incriminating statements, there
is in fact no constitutional question involved, but rather the sole in-
quiry should be whether the statements have probative value.
Under this approach to the problem, there are two possible ex-
tremes. On the one hand, a confession made while asleep could be
excluded as a matter of law.;- On the other hand, it could be admitted
as any other confession, the judge allowing the jury to determine its
credibility and requiring no more corroboration than he would if the
confession had been made while awake.27 It is submitted that neither
position should be adopted. Due to the possibility that such a con-
fession might have probative value, the public should not be handi-
capped in its administration of justice by an automatic rule of exclu-
sion, but neither should the accused be convicted on the basis of a
confession which arose from a world of fantasy. The admissibility of
a confession made while asleep should be left to the sound discretion
of the judge. In the exercise of that discretion, the judge should
require as corroboration of the confession not only proof of the corpus
delicti, but he should also require proof that all the surrounding cir-
that the introduction in evidence of recordings made by the defendant did not
violate his privilege against self-incrimination, since the privilege merely pro-
tected defendant from being required to testify against himself but did not bar
proof of the words spoken by him. It would seem that the rule adopted by the
principal case would extend the privilege to this situation.
24. Generally, statements of an accused made while intoxicated have been
held to be admissible. See, e.g., Mergner v. United States, 147 F.2d 572 (D.C.
Cir. 1945); Bell v. United States, 47 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1931). The court in the
Bell case stated that,
[T]he drunken condition of an accused when making a confession, unless
such drunkenness goes to the extent of mania, does not affect the admissi-
bility in evidence of such confession, but may affect its weight and credibility
with the jury.
Id. at 439.
25. Young v. United States, 107 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1939) (incriminating
statements made by defendant to fellow-prisoners in jail were admitted in evi-
dence although one of the witnesses was a federal officer who had disguised
himself as a prisoner); Lewis v. United States, 74 F.2d 173, 176-77 (9th Cir.
1934) (the making of false statements to the accused by officers as to the evidence
against him does not render a subsequent confession involuntary); Jackson v.
United States, 102 Fed. 473, 483 (9th Cir. 1900) (confession obtained by trick
is admissible) (dictum).
26. People v. Robinson, 19 Cal. *40, *41 (1861) (words spoken while asleep
do not constitute evidence of guilt); Martinez v. People, 55 Colo. 51, 132 Pac.
64 (1913) (words spoken while asleep are not voluntary and therefore are in-
admissible, but if there is doubt as to whether the accused was asleep, the question
should be left to the jury under pro er instructions); People v. Col6n, 52 P.R. 399,
404 (1937). The 31ODEL CODE OF VIDENCE rule 505(b) (1942) provides that a
confession made by the accused is admissible unless, at the time he made it,
the accused was unconscious or incapable of understanding what he said and did.
27. State v. Morgan, 35 W. Va. 260, 13 S.E. 385 (1891). In a situation where
it was not certain whether the accused was asleep, the court held that whether
the accuscd was asleep was a question for the jury and, even if he were asleep,
that it was a jury question whether the statements were worthless or whether
they sprang from a sense of guilt and were true.
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cumstances tend to connect the accused with the crime. If it is decided
that the confession is to be admitted, the jury, of course, should also
be warned of the doubtful validity of statements made while asleep. 8
By the use of this warning in conjunction with the requirement of
added corroboration, a two-fold protection would be provided which
would insure that any conviction based upon a confession made by a
defendant while asleep would be grounded in fact.
TORTS-LIABILITY FOR INDUCING NON-PERFORMANCE
OF UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACT
Evans v. Mayberry, 278 S.W.2d 691 (Tenn. 1955)
Plaintiff entered into an oral contract to purchase real estate from
his brother. Defendant, a third party with knowledge of the existence
of the contract, induced the vendor to sell the property to another.
In plaintiff's action for damages for inducing the vendor's non-per-
formance of the contract, the trial court sustained defendant's de-
murrer. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court, affirming the ruling
of the trial court, held that since the contract was not enforceable
between the parties because of the Statute of Frauds,' defendant could
not be held liable for inducing its non-performance. 2
Grounded in antiquity,3 the tort of "inducing breach of contract"
was limited to liability for enticing a servant from his master's em-
ployment 4 until 1853 when, in Lumely v. Gye,5 the doctrine was ex-
tended to include interference with any contract of personal service.
Later, the doctrine was further expanded to include contracts other
than those for personal services.6 The rule has been generally accepted
28. A problem arises where there is a question as to whether the accused was
asleep. This being a question of fact, it would have to be decided by the jury.
If the judge would admit the confession only if the accused was awake at the
time of making the confession, he should instruct the jury to disregard the con-
fession if they find he was asleep. See cases cited in notes 26 and 27 supra.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7831 (Williams 1934).
2. Evans v. Mayberry, 278 S.W.2d 691 (Tenn. 1955). The action was based on
a Tennessee statute providing for the recovery of treble damages against a person
who procures the breach of a "lawful" contract. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7811
(Williams 1934). In Watts v. Warner, 151 Tenn. 421, 269 S.W. 913 (1925), the
court held that under this statute an unenforceable contract was not a "lawful"
contract, and thus was not within the purview of the statute. As a matter of
statutory construction, this result is highly questionable since a contract may be
unenforceable merely because of technical defects and yet may not be "unlawfdl"
in the sense, of being illegal or contrary to public policy. While the court in the
principal case relied on the Watts case, the decision was not reached primarily on
the basis of statutory construction. See text supported by notes 22-24 infra.
3. For the history of the action, see PROSSE, TORTS 722-25 (2d ed. 1955);
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. Rnv. 663 (1923).
4. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 723; Sayre, supra note 3, at 665-66.
5. 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
6. Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 715 (C.A.).
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